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I. INTRODUCTION
Most investors throughout the world have a single goal: to earn the highest risk-
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adjusted financial returns. They would not accept a lower financial return from an
investment that also produced social benefits.
More recently, an increasing number of socially-motivated investors have goals
beyond maximizing returns.1 They also seek to align their investments with their social
values (value alignment), and some also seek to cause the companies in which they invest
to create more social value as a result of their investment (social value creation). We show
in this essay that while it is relatively easy to achieve value alignment, creating social value
is far more difficult.
Socially-motivated investors who seek value alignment prefer to own stocks only in
companies whose business and practices accord with their moral or social values.
Independent of whether their investment affects the company’s behavior, these investors
wish to conform their investment behavior with their social values by owning the stock of
companies that share them or refusing to own the stock of companies that do not.
Value-aligned investors may be concerned with a firm’s outputs—its products and
services. For example, they might want to own shares in an energy company that relies on
renewable resources and avoid owning shares in an energy company that relies on fossil

1. The most common reference for the amount of assets under management that take socially-related issues
into account in their investment strategies is that offered by the US SIF. US SIF & US SIF FOUND., REPORT ON
U.S. SUSTAINED, RESPONSIBLE AND IMPACT INVESTORS TRENDS 12–13 (11th ed. 2016),
https://www.ussif.org/files/SIF_Trends_16_Executive_Summary.pdf. It reports that assets under management
within three categories—sustainable, responsible and impact investing—increased from $6.57 trillion as of
January 1, 2014 to $8.72 trillion on January 1, 2016, representing some 20% of U.S. assets under management.
See, e.g., MORGAN STANLEY & CO., INVESTING WITH IMPACT, CREATING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL
VALUE
(2017),
https://www.morganstanley.com/assets/pdfs/articles/investing-withimpact.pdf (adopting SIF calculation). This quantification establishes that an expansive construction of the
environmental, social and governance categories (ESG) results in a substantial amount of assets that fall into this
very broad bucket. Fund Directions, a mutual fund trade publication, brings part of the calculation current by
reporting that ESG-focused public mutual funds had $2.9 billion in positive net investment inflows during 2017,
compared to $4.8 billion during 2016, in both cases during periods when actively managed general equity mutual
funds lost large amounts of assets. Yun Li, Morningstar: Demand for Sustainable Investing Soars, FUND INVS.
(July 10, 2017, 12:30 PM), http://fundintelligence.global./fundaction/news/morningstar-demand-for-sustainableinvestments-soars. (Subscription req.) Calendar year 2017 also saw five new ESG funds launched that offer
investors more choices focusing on sustainable portfolios. Hank Boerner, Morningstar Now Informs Investors
About ESG/Sustainable Mutual Funds – And The Good News is That ESG Funds’ AUM Continues to Grow,
GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY INST.: SUSTAINABILITY UPDATE (Oct. 24, 2017), https://gainstitute.com/Sustainability-Update/2017/10/24/morningstar-now-informs-investors-about-esgsustainablemutual-funds-and-the-good-news-is-that-esg-funds-aum-continues-to-grow. A related but one-off measure of
investor interest in more than financial return is the growth in the number of financial terminal clients who access
ESG data for their analysis. For example, Bloomberg reports that the number of its global clients who seek such
information reached 12,242 in 2016, having grown from 3010 in 2010. The 2017 number represents
approximately 3.7% of the total number of Bloomberg’s subscribers. See BLOOMBERG, 2016 IMPACT REPORT
(2016), https://data.bloomberglp.com/company/sites/28/2017/05/17_0516_Impact-Book_Final.pdf. However, as
we discuss in more detail in the remainder of this essay, ESG, broadly defined, lumps together very different
activities; for example, traditional fundamental analysis in the oil and gas industries necessarily involves
assessment of the impact of climate change on future fossil fuel demand. Including as ESG-managed assets, the
funds managed by investors who engage in fundamental oil and gas research and who care only about financial
returns is something of a stretch. This distinction is important, however, in assessing the recent proxy voting of
very large mutual funds. See generally infra note 45–47. ESG managed funds are better understood as facilitating
value-aligned investors to identify appropriate investments regardless of the impact of those values on riskadjusted expected financial returns.
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fuel.2 Other value-aligned investors might avoid owning shares in companies that
manufacture firearms or tobacco products. Or the investors may be concerned with a firm’s
practices—the way it produces its outputs. They might want to own shares in companies
with high environmental, social and governance (ESG) standards, and eschew companies
with poor ESG ratings.3 Value-aligned investors must only examine their personal values
and then learn whether a company’s practices promote or conflict with those values. They
then would assess the cost of value alignment by comparing the return on a portfolio
affected by these value-aligned weighting considerations compared to an otherwise
comparable unconstrained portfolio.4
Investors who wish to create social value begin with the same questions value-aligned
2. Of course, individuals have diverse views on what is socially valuable and on the appropriate tradeoff
among different values. For example, those concerned with protecting coal mining jobs in West Virginia to
address income inequality may value supporting low income communities through support for clean coal more
highly than concern over greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, when we refer to social value throughout this article,
we mean the particular investor’s values rather than any universal principles.
3. For example, B Analytics Ltd. publishes ESG ratings, see GIIRS Funds, B ANALYTICS, http://banalytics.net/giirs-ratings (last visited Mar. 3, 2018), and Morningstar publishes sustainability ratings, see Special
Report:
Morningstar
Sustainability
Rating,
MORNINGSTAR,
https://www.morningstar.com/articles/745467/morningstar-sustainability-rating.html (last updated Aug. 24,
2016). See also CASEY O’CONNOR & SARAH LABOWITZ, N.Y.U. CTR. FOR BUS. & HUM. RTS., PUTTING THE “S”
IN
ESG:
MEASURING
HUMAN
RIGHTS
PERFORMANCE
FOR
INVESTORS
(2017),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/547df270e4b0ba184dfc490e/t/58cad912e58c6274180b58b6/14896888547
54/Metrics-Report-final-1.pdf (demonstrating the difficulty in identifying a rating system, focusing on the social
component of ESG, and assessing 12 existing measurement techniques). Given the range of factors necessary to
construct a rating structure, and the fact that different investors will weight various ESG factors differently, it is
not surprising that there are many ratings systems. A recent Department of Labor study addressed to pension
funds reviews the literature. See OGECHUKWU EZEOKOLI ET AL., SUMMIT CONSULTING, ENVIRONMENTAL,
SOCIAL, AND GOVERNANCE (ESG) INVESTMENT TOOLS: A REVIEW OF THE CURRENT FIELD (2017),
http://www.dol.gov/asp/evaluation/completed-studies/ESG-Investment-Tools-Review-of-the-Current-Field.pdf.
4. Mutual funds that limit their investment options in this fashion typically will disclose the extent to
which their fund’s performance diverges from a benchmark that is comparable but is unconstrained. As an
extreme example, the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund, with a portfolio of $11 trillion, has over the last decade
gradually excluded from its portfolio the stock of companies that produce tobacco, nuclear arms, and cluster
weapons. They also exclude companies that engage in coal mining and coal-fired generation. Over this period,
the constrained portfolio has underperformed the unconstrained benchmark on an annual basis by six basis points
(0.06%). NORGES BANK INV. MGMT., RETURN AND RISK: GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND GLOBAL (2017),
http://www.nbim.no/en/transparency/reports/2017/return-and-risk-2017/ (follow the “Download the publication
(PDF)” hyperlink). In a fossil fuel industry funded paper, DANIEL R. FISCHEL ET AL., FOSSIL FUEL DIVESTMENT
AND PUBLIC PENSION FUNDS (2017), http://divestmentfacts.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Divestment-andPublic-Pension-Funds_FINAL.pdf, have estimated that 11 large public pension funds’ annual returns would have
been reduced by 15 basis points (0.15%) over the previous 50 years were fossil fuel companies excluded from
their portfolios. Id. at 3–5. Mats Andersson et al., Hedging Climate Risk, 72 FIN. ANALYSIS J. 13 (2016), provide
a more sophisticated analysis, defining the socially-motivated investor’s goal not as divestiture, but instead
reducing the total carbon footprint of companies in its portfolio. Using financial engineering techniques, they
show that, based on back testing, the carbon footprint of an engineered portfolio can be reduced by 40% with no
tracking error compared to an unconstrained benchmark. The large empirical literature reports mixed results with
respect to how much, if at all, the performance of constrained funds falls short of that of an unconstrained index.
See, e.g., Luc Renneboog et al., The Price of Ethics and Stakeholder Governance: The Performance of Socially
Responsible Mutual Funds, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 302 (2008); Allen Ferrell et al., Socially Responsible Firms, 122 J.
FIN. ECON. 585 (2016); Gunnar Friede et al., ESG and Financial Performance: Aggregated Evidence from More
than 2000 Empirical Studies, 5 J. SUS. FIN. & INV. 210 (2016); Michael S. Knoll, Ethical Screening in Modern
Financial Markets: The Conflicting Claims underlying Socially Responsible Investment, 57 BUS. LAW. 681
(2002).
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investors do, but then must move on to the more challenging task of deploying their capital
to increase an investee company’s socially valuable outputs—for example, by enabling the
company to provide additional health care or education to poor people in developing
countries. Appropriately called “impact investments,” these investments must lower the
cost of capital to the investee firm compared to the cost available to the company in
ordinary commercial markets, or otherwise cause it to produce more socially valuable
outputs or to engage in more socially valuable practices—the criteria for creating social
value.
Both investors seeking value alignment and those seeking to create social value face
the initial question of what financial sacrifice, if any, they must accept to achieve their
social goals. When can investors achieve these goals—value alignment or value creation—
through non-concessionary investments, from which they expect a full risk-adjusted
market-rate financial return?5 When must the investments be concessionary, sacrificing
some financial return to achieve social goals?
The literature published by asset managers, charitable foundations, and related trade
associations manifests considerable optimism that socially-motivated investors can ensure
value alignment and, indeed, create social value through non-concessionary investments.
Some asset managers claim to provide their investors (at least) value alignment with no
financial concession,6 while others hold out the prospect of “excess financial return” or
“alpha”―value alignment with better than risk-adjusted market returns.7 And some asset
managers promise their investors the gold ring: social value creation without sacrificing
financial return.8 Similarly, some foundations imply that they can create social value
through non-concessionary investments of their endowment assets and urge their peers to
follow suit.9
We are skeptical about many of these claims. Precisely because the socially-motivated
market sector is growing so rapidly, participants on both the sell-side and the buy-side of
the market label their activities in a loose fashion that reflects either their aspirations or
their marketing strategies rather than measurable results.
The need for clarity and precision in defining a socially-motivated asset management
strategy is highlighted by the term impact investing. The attractions of impact investing are
obvious. Socially-motivated investors seek change, and having an impact on the direction
and pace of change through one’s investments resonates powerfully with that aspiration.
Yet this resonance has led to a grab bag of investment strategies that all claim the same

5. The judgments of different investors also may differ about what financial returns a particular investment
is likely to produce. For our purposes, it is the particular investor’s judgment that is relevant.
6. See, e.g., CALVERT INVS., INC., http://www.calvert.com/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2018); see Andersson et
al., supra note 4 (discussing the financial engineering necessary to construct a portfolio that significantly reduces
the portfolio’s carbon footprint relative to a benchmark index without meaningful tracking error; that is, without
an offsetting increase in risk or reduction in return).
7. E.g., GENERATION INV. MGMT., https://www.generationim.com/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2018).
8. E.g., SCHULZE GLOB. INVS., http://schulzeglobal.com/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2017); EQUILIBRIUM CAP.
GRP., http://www.eq-cap.com/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2018) (stating that Equilibrium Capital focuses on
“sustainability-driven real assets investment strategies” and “drives economic value, portfolio advantage and . . .
alpha returns through scale and effective management”).
9. E.g., HERON FOUND., http://heron.org/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2018). See generally CLARA MILLER,
HERON
FOUND.,
THE
WORLD
HAS
CHANGED
AND
SO
MUST
WE
(2012),
https://www.heron.org/sites/default/files/The%20World%20Has%20Changed.pdf (explaining the purpose of the
F.B. Heron Foundation).
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mantle but with more or less precision and evidence of impact. The core of asset
management is evaluation and benchmark comparison. Absent a clear framework for the
strategy and, hence, a well-defined benchmark against which portfolio returns should be
measured, neither evaluation nor comparison is possible. Without both, the sociallymotivated investment market segment will suffer.
We do not doubt that with care and skill, it is possible to achieve value alignment with
limited financial concessions over time.10 But while we disagree with those who define
impact investing to include only concessionary investments, it is in our view very difficult
to create social value through one’s investments while nonetheless earning full (sociallyneutral) risk-adjusted and illiquidity-adjusted financial returns. In any event, we believe
that the term “impact investor,” as its name implies, should be reserved for investors who
seek social value creation rather than simply value alignment. The social investing field
can grow responsibly only if individual investors, impact investing trade associations, and
asset managers are candid with themselves and others about the conditions necessary for
real impact.11
In this Article, we first address the problem of imprecise terminology that presents a
barrier to important issues actually being joined. In particular, we address a range of terms
that are commonly and confusedly used in the social investing community. We then present
a straight forward taxonomy of socially-motivated investments that identifies what should
count as impact investing and how that framing relates to concessionary and nonconcessionary investments.
Such a taxonomy allows investors to articulate their goals and allows asset managers
to articulate clearly what they offer and how their performance should be measured. Putting
forward a clear taxonomy is not, as a commentator on an earlier version of this Article put
it, “prescriptive.”12 There are many ways to make important contributions, but the field
badly needs a benchmark against which claims of social value creation can be measured.
Specifying that benchmark allows the actual debate to begin.
We next address three big questions in that debate. First, can investments in public
companies achieve value alignment or create social value, whether or not with concessions
on return? Second, can investments in private companies create social value, again whether
or not with return concessions? Third, can socially-motivated investors working with other
stakeholders cause public companies to create social value?
Our conclusions are as follows:


Impact investments in public markets. It is virtually impossible for investors
to affect the outputs or behavior of firms whose securities trade in public

10. See generally Andersson et. al., supra note 4 (presenting an investment strategy designed to allow
“long-term passive investors to hedge climate risk without sacrificing financial returns”).
11. See Brian Trelstad, Impact Investing: A Brief History, 11 CAPITALISM & SOC’Y 1, 3 (2016),
http://capitalism.columbia.edu/journal/11/2-0 (click on article title link) (noting that standard definitions of
impact investing are so broad “that it is hard to identify what is an impact investment and what is not”).
12. See Nancy E. Pfund & Lisa Alexander, Response to “How Investors Can (and Can’t) Create Social
Value,”
STAN.
SOC.
INNOVATION
REV.
(Dec.
8,
2016),
https://ssir.org/up_for_debate/how_investors_can_and_cant_create_social_value/pfund_hagerman
(“[T]here
does not have to be a sacrifice between achieving top-tier financial return and possible positive social and
environmental impacts.”).
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markets through buying and selling securities in the secondary market.
Socially-motivated investors who seek to improve ESG performance or
otherwise increase the social value produced by a public company must join
forces with consumers, employees, corporative activists, and regulators to
affect portfolio company behavior. The recent success of climate changerelated proxy proposals at major oil companies illustrate the point:13
portfolio strategy alone will not work. Finally, secondary investments in
public markets are inevitably non-concessionary save through the loss of
portfolio diversification.
Concessionary investments in private markets. It is possible, however, for
impact investors to affect the outputs of firms in private market transactions
by accepting financial returns below those required by socially-neutral
investors. Foundations’ program-related investments are paradigmatic of
such subsidies.
Non-concessionary investments in private markets. It is also possible for
impact investors to affect the outputs of private firms through nonconcessionary investments by taking advantage of private knowledge that
they or their asset managers possess. However, non-concessionary investors’
claims to have private information should be taken with a grain of salt. These
investors are playing in a highly competitive game against the universe of
private equity investors whose success depends on developing value-relevant
private information regardless of the strategy.

II. THE TERMINOLOGY OF FOUNDATIONS AND OTHER PROFESSIONAL SOCIALLYMOTIVATED INVESTORS14
The first step in our analysis addresses the imprecise and confusing terminology used
by foundations and other professional socially-motivated investors, as well as asset
managers who seek their patronage. This imprecision creates a barrier to debate and, more
important, to assessment. Readers will note that elements of this common terminology
often overlap. Next, in Part II we focus on the term impact investment and specify what
investments can and cannot create social value. Part III addresses concessionary and nonconcessionary investments. This precision permits investors to articulate their goals
clearly, and allows asset managers to articulate what they offer clearly and, most important,
how their performance should be measured.
A. Unpacking Common Terminology
Impact Investments are socially-motivated investments made for the purpose of
increasing or improving the socially-valuable outputs and practices of investee enterprises:
for example, manufacturing anti-malaria bed netting or reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
In our terms, these investments seek to create social value. Impact investments can be made
by all types of investors: foundations, family offices, endowments, funds, and individuals.
As we discuss in Part II, social value is created only by increasing the amount of an investee
company’s socially beneficial outputs or their quality rather than just aligning the
13. See infra pp. 120–21.
14. See MISSION INV’RS. EXCH., INC., https://www.missioninvestors.org/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2018).
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investors’ portfolio decisions with their social values. This necessary causal link between
the investment and an increase in socially-desirable outputs is commonly blurred in the
social investment community.15
Impact investments may be concessionary or non-concessionary. Some investment
funds, such as Equilibrium Capital, claim to create social value and also claim to be nonconcessionary, targeting market returns.16 Others, such as Acumen Fund,17 expect to earn
less than market returns as the price of creating social value. And some, such as Bridges
Ventures UK and Omidyar Network,18 consider both types of investments, thereby holding
out the potential of non-concessionary returns. The significance of this distinction is
discussed in Part III.
Mission, or mission-related, investments refer to investments made by a foundation in
pursuit of its charitable mission. They fall into two categories:
 Non-concessionary mission investments have the primary purpose of
generating financial returns to fund the socially-motivated investor’s
programmatic efforts but are limited to companies whose outputs or practices
are consistent with the foundation’s mission.19 Non-concessionary mission
15. The confusion over what is included in the impact investment category may reflect the apparent absence
of attention in the academic community. Robert Robb and Martine Sattell report that based on all issues of six
“top” economics and finance journals (AM. ECON. REV., ECONOMETRICA, J. FIN., J. ECON. LIT., J. POL. ECON., Q.
J. ECON.) available on JSTOR, not a single article uses the term “impact investing.” Robert Robb & Martine
Satell, Socially Responsible/Impact Investing: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, CAPITALISM & SOC’Y (2016).
Morgan Stanley & Co., for example, provides a good example of why precision is needed. Its overall ESG
platform is titled Investing with Impact: Creating Economic, Social and Environmental Value. When one reads
further, the prospective investor is advised that only private market investments are held out as having the
potential to create value. This casual usage of the term impact investment can at best confuse investors and at
worst mislead them. See MORGAN STANLEY & CO., supra note 1.
16. See EQUILIBRIUM CAPITAL GROUP, supra note 8 (fund claims to create social value and be nonconcessionary).
17. See ACUMEN FUND INC., http://www.acumen.org/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2018) (fund claims to earn less
than market returns in order to create social value).
18. See BRIDGES FUND MGMT., LTD., http://www.bridgesfundmanagement.com/us/ (last visited Oct. 8,
2017) (making both claims); OMIDYAR NETWORK, http://www.omidyar.com (last visited Mar. 3, 2018) (making
both claims).
19. Under a 2015 interpretation of I.R.C. § 4944, Investments Made for Charitable Purposes, the IRS
advised that “[u]nder the regulations, an investment made by a private foundation will not be considered to be a
jeopardizing investment [and so subject to excise tax] if, in making the investment, the foundation managers
exercise ordinary business care and prudence (under the circumstances prevailing at the time the investment is
made) in providing for the long-term and short-term financial needs of the foundation to carry out its charitable
purposes.” I.R.S. Notice 2015-62, 2015-39 I.R.B. 411, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-15-62.pdf.
Outside the tax area, the Delaware Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act, DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 12, §§ 4701–4710 (2007), from which most U.S. nonprofits derive their guidance, takes much the same
position as the IRS. Delaware explicitly requires that persons making investment decisions on behalf of an
institution consider the institution’s charitable purpose, characterizing this as a “fundamental duty.” Under
standard features of Delaware corporate law, this would require the board to consider whether the foundation’s
purpose warranted accepting a lower financial return to achieve a charitable purpose (and vice versa). That
decision would be protected by the business judgment rule. To our knowledge, the Delaware Attorney General
has never made an allegation of imprudence with respect to Delaware nonprofits’ social impact investments.
In contrast, the Labor Department, which administers the Employee Retirement and Security Act (ERISA), is
significantly more restrictive than either the IRS or Delaware. Plan fiduciaries that are subject to ERISA may take
ESG considerations into account in making portfolio decisions only if doing so does not negatively impact
investment returns. Thus, such pension funds may not make concessionary investments: “Under ERISA, the plan
trustee or other investing fiduciary may not use plan assets to promote social, environmental, or other public
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investments seek at least value alignment but with market-rate risk-adjusted
returns.
 Concessionary mission investments are typically made as program-related
investments (PRIs). This category is a construct of the U.S. Internal Revenue
Code, which requires that PRIs’ primary purpose be to further the
foundation’s charitable purposes rather than only to secure financial returns
even if the returns will be used to further the charitable purpose. For example,
it is highly unlikely that a foundation would invest in the public bond market
though it might well use a PRI to finance a social impact bond that addressed
one of the foundation’s charitable purposes, or more generally make
concessionary investments in debt instruments for the same purpose.20 Like
grants, PRIs count toward a foundation’s required annual mission-related
payout of five percent of its endowment. And like grants, PRIs seek to create
social value, that is, to increase or improve the investee’s socially-valuable
outputs.
Socially-responsible investments are investments whose primary purpose is to
generate financial returns that are consistent with certain values―what we have called
value alignment investing. These include, for example, investments in companies that
engage in good ESG practices that may be independent of a foundation’s particular
mission. For example, a foundation whose charitable purpose does not include
environmental improvement, or a university, may still prefer not to hold stock in fossil fuel
companies; hence, the familiar targeting of universities in divestiture campaigns. Thus,
socially responsible investing also includes divesting from, or not investing in, companies
whose outputs (e.g., alcohol, tobacco, firearms, or gambling) or business practices (poor
treatment of employees or environmental degradation) conflict with the investor’s values.
Most socially responsible investments take place in public markets, for example,

policy causes at the expense of the financial interests of the plan’s participants and beneficiaries. Fiduciaries may
not accept lower expected returns or take on greater risks in order to secure collateral benefits.” 29 C.F.R. §
2059.95-1 (2015). Under the 2015 Interpretive Bulletin, one would expect, however, that a good faith belief by
the trustees based on reasonable diligence as to the non-concessionary character of an investment would protect
them from liability, thus narrowing somewhat the difference between the standards. Ning Chiu et al., The Impact
of DOL Guidance on ESG-Focused Plans, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May.
8,
2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/08/the-impact-of-dol-guidance-on-esg-focused-plans/. The risk,
of course, is that the ambiguity may suggest a more intrusive regulatory review and a higher likelihood of trustee
liability. One might wonder whether the game is worth the candle. Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff,
The Law and Economics of Environmental, Social, and Governance Investing by a Fiduciary (Harv. L. Sch. John
M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus. Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 971, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3244665 (click “Download This Paper”), (reviewing the
legal standards applicable to trustees under trust law and ERISA, and review the empirical literature concerning
whether taking ESG considerations into account reduces portfolio returns).
20. A social impact bond is a form of pay for performance contract in which a government contracts with
an expert organization to plan and execute a social project in which the expert is paid based on achieving
milestones specified in the contract, for example, reducing recidivism among released prisoners. The expert’s
efforts are funded through bonds under which payments are made only if the project meets its contractually
specified milestones. Foundations do invest in funding such bonds. See generally JEFFREY LIEBMAN & ALINA
SELLMAN, HARVARD KENNEDY SCH. SOC. IMPACT BOND TECH. ASSISTANCE LAB, SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS: A
GUIDE
FOR
STATE
AND
LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS
1,
8
(2013),
https://govlab.hks.harvard.edu/files/siblab/files/social-impact-bonds-a-guide-for-state-and-localgovernments.pdf.
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through public mutual funds that impose a screen on their portfolios to exclude companies
whose activities are antithetical to the values of many socially-motivated investors. These
funds hold themselves out to investors as being capable of earning non-concessionary
returns—they are expected to earn at least risk-adjusted market returns.
III. IMPACT AS A REQUISITE OF SOCIAL VALUE CREATION
To say that a socially-motivated investment creates social value is to say that the
investment produces a social impact—that is, an outcome that would not occur but for the
investment. In the language of evaluation, what would happen without the investment is
called the counterfactual. For an investment to actually have social impact, it must meet
two conditions:
 Enterprise impact. The investee company must produce the investor’s
intended social outcomes; and
 Investment impact, additionality, or social value-added. The investment
must increase the production of those outcomes.21
To illustrate enterprise impact, suppose that a socially-motivated investor invested in
a company that provides health care for the poor in a developing country. Enterprise impact
requires that firm-related health care professionals are in fact serving the poor (or will when
its strategy is implemented) and, as a result, that their clients have (or will have) better
health outcomes. As with any investment, the outcome can only be predicted when the
investment is made. Here the measure is ex post: were the expectations met?22
The matter of investment impact, or as we’ll call it henceforth, social value added, is
unique to impact investing. For an investment to meet the condition of social value added,
it must increase the amount or quality of the investee company’s socially valuable outputs
or practices compared to what they would be with only socially-neutral investments. As
we will explain below, an investor who believes that mobile telephony has tremendous
social and economic benefits might have social impact by investing in a risky mobile
telephone startup in a developing country or in the rural U.S., but cannot have impact by
buying AT&T or Verizon stock on the New York Stock Exchange. In the former case, the
investor may provide essential capital that the start-up cannot get elsewhere or on the same
favorable terms; in the latter case, the investment will not result in additional mobile phone
access for even a single customer.
An investment can affect a business’s operations in two fundamental ways: through
(1) financial impact, or (2) signaling mechanisms.
Financial Impact: Assume the investor believes that the company has opportunities
to increase its production of social value. An investment results in financial impact if it
21. In some cases, for example, greenhouse gas production, the desired output change is negative. While
the problem can be solved rhetorically, say by framing the goal as increasing the production of carbon neutral
product, in the interests of presentation we will ignore the distinction except when it has substantive consequences.
22. The challenges of assessing the social impact of for-profit enterprises are not conceptually different
from assessing the impact of nonprofit organizations generally—the subject of much writing and good work in
recent years. See, e.g., PAUL J. GERTLER ET AL., WORLD BANK, IMPACT EVALUATION IN PRACTICE (2011)
(eBook),
https://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTHDOFFICE/Resources/54857261295455628620/Impact_Evaluation_in_Practice.pdf; ABHIJIT V. BANERJEE & ESTHER DUFLO, POOR
ECONOMICS: A RADICAL RETHINKING OF THE WAY TO FIGHT GLOBAL POVERTY (2011). There is less consensus
on how those outcomes should (or can) be measured. We will not address this problem here other than to note the
necessity that disciplined measurement be undertaken.
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provides more capital, or capital at lower cost, than the enterprise could otherwise secure
from socially-neutral investors.23 Under these circumstances, the investment meets the
criterion for creating social value.24 Conversely, an investor’s divesting of its holdings in a
company would have financial impact only if it deprived a wicked enterprise (that is, one
that generates negative welfare consequences to the public at large) of needed capital that
it cannot replace at an equivalent cost. If the capital can be replaced at the same cost, then
the divestment may create value alignment but does not create social value other than
possibly through signaling impact. As we will see, divesting stock in a publicly traded
company will not directly increase a wicked enterprise’s cost of capital. Just as sociallyneutral private equity and venture capital firms also provide non-monetary assistance, so
may social impact investors, for example, by improving management and governance,
fundraising, and networking. Because such assistance is almost always ancillary to
providing financial impact, we will include it in this category rather than create a new
one.25
Signaling Impact: A socially-motivated investment decision may indirectly affect an
enterprise’s cost of capital by signaling approval or disapproval of the enterprise’s strategy
and actions to consumers, employees, regulators, or other stakeholders, thereby affecting
stakeholders’ direct interaction with the enterprise through their purchasing, employment
or regulatory decisions. The investor may also engage in “shareholder activism” by
initiating or voting proxy resolutions with the goal of affecting the corporation’s behavior.
IV. CONCESSIONARY VS. NON-CONCESSIONARY INVESTMENTS
As previously defined, a concessionary investment is one with a below-market riskadjusted expected financial return. The concession is the economic equivalent of a donation
or grant intended to create social value. Whether an investment by a foundation is nonconcessionary or concessionary is a question of its expected risk-adjusted return, and not
whether the funds come from the endowment or program budget, which is a matter of
internal governance and accounting.26
Socially-motivated concessionary investments have the potential to reduce an
enterprise’s cost of capital. By definition, socially-neutral investors will not invest at
below-market rates while socially-motivated concessionary investors may do exactly that.
23. Paul Brest & Kelly Born, When Can Impact Investing Create Real Impact?, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION
REV. 22, 22 (2013).
24. See, e.g., BRIDGES FUND MGMT, BRIDGES IMPACT REPORT: A SPOTLIGHT ON OUR METHODOLOGY
(2013),
http://www.bridgesfundmanagement.com/publications/bridges-impact-report-2013-spotlightmethodology/; SOC. IMPACT INV. TASKFORCE, MEASURING IMPACT (2014), http://gsgii.org/reports/measuringimpact/ (click on “Download Report” link).
25. Investments are occasionally designed to improve an entire sector. This is the rationale for some of
Omidyar Network’s investments. See MATT BANNICK & PAULA GOLDMAN, OMIDYAR NETWORK, PRIMING THE
PUMP: THE CASE FOR A SECTOR BASED APPROACH TO IMPACT INVESTING (2012),
https://www.omidyar.com/sites/default/files/file_archive/insights/Priming%20the%20Pump_Omidyar%20Netw
ork_Sept_2012.pdf. Similarly, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation invested in M-KOPA, which sells solar
panels to consumers on credit, to demonstrate a new financial asset class safe enough to qualify for commercial
bank financing. See Paul Brest, Investing for Impact with Program-Related Investments, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION
REV. 1 (2016), https://ssir.org/articles/entry/investing_for_impact_with_program_related_investments (last
visited Mar. 3, 2018).
26. If one were to characterize a grant as an “investment,” as is often done metaphorically, it would be an
investment with a 100% financial return, since a grant entails a total loss of capital.
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The potential upside of a concessionary investment is that, by providing capital at belowmarket rates, it will have an impact: the investee firm can produce more socially valuable
outputs. The potential downside is failure—that the subsidy will not create social value—
but failure is possible with respect to any investment whether socially-motivated or not. As
well, the investment may merely redound to the benefit of other investors; or worse, the
subsidy may distort the markets in which the company operates to the ultimate detriment
of the investors’ intended beneficiaries.27
Although we have characterized a concessionary investment as one that sacrifices
risk-adjusted market returns, there are two ways in which even a seemingly nonconcessionary investment may compromise the investor’s financial interests. The first
focuses on the phrase risk-adjusted returns: a socially-motivated investment may sacrifice
portfolio diversification, thereby causing the investor to bear risk for which he will not be
compensated. We would expect this effect to be most prominent when a socially-motivated
investor divests from an entire sector (e.g., fossil fuels) or overweights a particular sector
because of the potential for social gain (e.g., renewable energy).28
If certain stocks (or industries) are perceived to be “mispriced” in that they offer
greater than risk-adjusted returns, risk-averse investors will rationally choose to sacrifice
an element of diversification to secure the higher returns. They will overweight (hold more
of that security than appropriate to diversify efficiently) the undervalued security (or
industry) in their portfolio to the point where the greater expected return is offset by the
perceived cost of greater portfolio risk due to reduced diversification. The less risk-averse
an investor, the more they are willing to sacrifice diversification to achieve higher expected
return.
Similarly, if investment in (or divestment from) certain stocks or industries are
believed to give rise to increased socially desirable outcomes, then socially-motivated
investors will rationally choose to sacrifice an element of diversification by overweighting
(or underweighting) such securities or industries in their portfolios. They will do so up to
the point where the value they attach to the socially desirable outcomes produced at the
margin are offset by the cost of greater portfolio risk from lost diversification. The greater
the value investors place on the social benefits their investments produce, the more they

27. See Matt Bannick & Paula Goldman, Do No Harm: Subsidies and Impact Investing, STAN. SOC.
INNOVATION REV. (Sept. 28, 2012), https://ssir.org/articles/entry/do_no_harm_subsidies_and_impact_investing;
Michael Kubzansky, Why Business Models Matter, in GETTING TO SCALE: HOW TO BRING DEVELOPMENT
SOLUTIONS TO MILLIONS OF POOR PEOPLE 33 (Laurence Chandy et al. eds., 2013).
28. To see this, keep in mind that most equity investments yield returns that are positively correlated with
one another because of common macroeconomic factors affecting nearly all investments. However, these
macroeconomic factors typically explain only 40% of the total variation in equity returns. Of the remaining 60%
variation, about one third, or 20% of total volatility, is explained by factors common to the stock’s industry (the
industry is typically described by its Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)). The final 40% of total volatility is,
on average, idiosyncratic to specific stocks. These statistics imply that if stocks are correctly priced to reflect their
risks, well-diversified portfolios can eliminate as much as 60% of the risk of holding a single security without
sacrificing expected returns. If investors concentrated their bets in a single industry with a portfolio of, say, 25
equally weighted positions, they could eliminate approximately 30% of the risk; that is, none of the common
industry risk factors would be eliminated, and 80% (1–1/(25^.5)) of the 40% of risk that is idiosyncratic would
be eliminated. There are interesting efforts to create portfolios that, for example, significantly reduce a portfolio’s
exposure to a socially-negative characteristic like the portfolio’s carbon footprint, but without significantly
deviating from the performance of an unconstrained benchmark portfolio. See generally Andersson et al., supra
note 4.
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should be willing to sacrifice diversification to achieve it.29
The second way in which financial returns can be compromised by socially-motivated
investments is through incremental asset management costs incurred in pursuing this
category of investments. The due diligence efforts of socially-neutral fund managers or
investment staff is designed solely to enhance financial returns. By contrast, socially
motivated fund managers must conduct due diligence and post-investment interventions to
enhance social as well as financial performance—resulting in higher aggregate evaluation
and monitoring costs.30 Such costs may be partially outsourced to fund managers and
consultants who charge incremental fees for assembling socially-screened investment
portfolios and incremental fees for manufacturing benchmarks against which such
portfolios can be evaluated for investment performance. Nonetheless, the fees paid to fund
managers and consultants is still an increase in costs over those associated with a socially
neutral investment strategy. In addition, the absence of clear measures of social impact
causes this second category of due diligence information to be comparatively more
expensive—and less informative—than due diligence concerning financial returns. Market
demand and regulatory mandates have reduced the cost of acquiring financial information
and have produced clear standards for determining what information is necessary.
Information concerning social value creation remains far behind in both the cost of
information and in developing shared standards of what to measure and how the
measurement should be made and audited.31
To the extent that these additional costs are not compensated by incremental returns,
the net financial returns to socially motivated investors will suffer. Such sacrifices in net
financial returns may be mitigated by a subsidy provided by individuals working for
socially motivated investors who accept lower compensation than they could get elsewhere
because of their social commitment.32 Such hidden subsidies effectively make such
29. See generally id. The authors argue that a properly constructed low carbon index can allow investors to
better align their portfolio with their social values with little or no sacrifice in diversification benefits. They also
argue that if a sufficient number of investors favor such hedged portfolios, the cost of capital of high carbon
footprint companies will increase. While an investment in a decarbonized index of stocks may represent an
effective strategy for hedging climate risk, we are skeptical that such an index can meaningfully affect high carbon
footprint companies’ cost of capital, as we discuss in the next section.
30. In a study commissioned by the fossil fuel industry, Hendrik Bessembinder examines the additional
transaction costs associated with creating and maintaining a constrained portfolio—one that excludes companies
or industries based on ESG criteria. HENDRIK BESSEMBINDER, INDEP. PETROLEUM ASS’N OF AM., FRICTIONAL
COSTS OF FOSSIL FUEL DIVESTMENT 8–16 (2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2789878 (Click on “Download This
Paper”).
31. See Michael T. Cappucci, The ESG Integration Paradox, 30 J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN. 22, 26–27 (2018)
(Cappucci, Senior Vice President of the Harvard Management Company, stresses the costs associated with
integrating ESG characteristics in portfolio selection). The Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SSAB),
founded in 2011, is a private sector standards setting board that seeks to set environmentally-related disclosure
standards for a variety of industries. The goal is to accomplish for sustainability accounting the same reduction
in disclosure costs accomplished for financial accounting by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (the
FASB). It is important to recognize the FASB has the far easier job because its goal is to provide disclosure that
allows assessment of a single goal: maximizing firm value. As we stated in O’CONNOR & LABOWITZ, supra note
3, at 25–30, ESG assessment requires tradeoffs among multiple goals, about which investors will often disagree.
Gianni Betti, Costanza Consolandi, and Robert G. Eccles present a sophisticated (and complicated) approach to
linking reporting and development goals in The Relationship between Investor Materiality and Sustainable
Development Goals: A Methodological Framework, 10 SUSTAINABILITY 1 (2018).
32. See, e.g., ROBERT FRANK, WHAT PRICE THE MORAL HIGH GROUND? HOW TO SUCCEED WITHOUT
SELLING YOUR SOUL 76–86 (discussing the reasons socially-motivated individuals work in non-profit sector);
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investments even more concessionary.
V. THE FIRST BIG QUESTION: CAN INVESTMENTS IN PUBLIC MARKETS CREATE SOCIAL
VALUE?
When can investments or divestments in public capital markets have an impact by
affecting the behavior of portfolio companies directly through purchasing company
securities? The answer is virtually never. Because this issue has generated so much
discussion within the socially-motivated investment community, we have set out in detail
the analysis that gives rise to our skepticism that non-concessionary public market
investments can create social value.
The paradigmatic public market involves the active trading of securities by many
buyers and sellers in corporations that produce multi-billion-dollar capitalizations on
organized stock exchanges. Now suppose that a publicly-traded company produces outputs
that are valued by a socially-motived investor. These might include, for example, clean
energy or drugs to cure diseases whose development would not be supported by the markets
to be served. Impact investors who value these social goods would buy shares of the
company if they believed that the purchase would cause the company’s share price to
increase, thus causing its cost of capital to fall. As a result, (1) the company would be able
to finance more projects that produced the valued social benefits, (2) the company would
need to sell fewer shares to raise any given amount of capital, (3) or more capital could be
raised for any given number of shares issued. All three cases financing an increased volume
of desirable projects.
But most investors in public markets are socially-neutral—hence, indifferent to a
firm’s social value in the context of their investment decision. Therefore, in public markets,
any premium in the valuation of shares that results from socially-motivated investors
clamoring to own them presents an opportunity for socially-neutral bargain-hunters to
profit from selling shares that are overpriced (from a purely financial perspective). For
example, if two companies are alike in all respects except that one produces sociallyvaluable goods and the other does not, any increase in the share price of the former will
prompt socially-neutral investors to sell their shares and buy shares of the latter. This
arbitrage process would continue until the stock prices of the two companies were identical,
thereby eliminating any share price impact based on the socially-motivated trading, and
therefore neutralizing any social value added. Indeed, the socially-neutral investors need
not own the overpriced shares to accomplish this arbitrage. They could borrow the shares
owned by others and sell the borrowed shares—the common practice called short-selling.33
Karine Nyborg & Tao Zhang, Is Corporate Social Responsibility Associated with Lower Wages, 55 ENVTL. &
RESOURCE ECON. 107, 107–16 (2013) (discussing the motivation for socially driven work and outcomes).
33. Of course, there are frictional costs associated with socially-neutral bargain hunters engaging in such
behavior, so it is possible that if there were enough social-motivated investors in the world, they would, in fact,
reduce the cost of capital to producers to whom the investors were attracted by social issues. But we do not believe
that such investors come remotely close to comprising a sufficient fraction of the market today to make much, if
any, difference in the public markets. Recent estimates of the value of investment assets of impact investors as a
fraction of overall public equity market capitalization is less than one-tenth of one percent. See Lisette Cooper et
al., Social Finance and the Postmodern Portfolio: Theory and Practice, 18 J. WEALTH MGMT. 9 (2016). Note the
estimate in supra note 1, that socially-motivated investments comprise 20% of assets under management includes
all forms of such investment rather than only impact investment. Because sophisticated investors understand that
impact investing is possible only in private markets, it is fair to assume that the great bulk of socially-motivated
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In any event, purchasing existing shares of stock in a public company that produces
socially-desirable outcomes is not equivalent to purchasing new shares issued by that
company.34 One person’s purchase of shares is another person’s sale. Unless the company
raises fresh capital in the primary markets, the scale of its activities is largely unaffected
by secondary market transactions.
Of course, public companies sometimes do return to the primary markets to raise
capital. In principle, public firms could advertise for subsidized capital in the primary
markets to finance socially-desirable activities. For example, an electric power company
whose stock trades at $100 per share could announce that it is seeking investors to purchase
newly-issued shares at $120 each so that the firm could afford to convert coal-fired plants
to cleaner-burning gas-fired plants without causing existing investors to suffer a decline in
share price below $100. If investors deemed the social value of improving the environment
in this way to be worth at least $20 per share and could lock in the company’s
environmental commitment, they would find such an investment attractive even knowing
that the share price would fall to $100 in the secondary market. In effect, socially-motivated
investors would be making a $20 per share grant to the investee company conditioned on
the company using the grant, in combination with raising non-concessionary capital, to
convert its plants.35
We do not recall ever having seen an offering by a public company that has this
characteristic, but in principle a socially-motivated investor could have social impact by
investing in a public company’s primary issuance of shares on subsidized or
“concessionary” terms.36 This example provides a natural segue to the more plausible
claim that opportunities for impact investing—creating social value—are available in
private markets.
VI. THE SECOND BIG QUESTION: CAN INVESTMENTS IN PRIVATE MARKETS CREATE
SOCIAL VALUE?
If purchases of publicly traded stock cannot create social value, what about
investments in private companies? For our purposes, the critical difference is that in private
markets value-relevant information about a company is significantly less widely shared,
ownership interests do not trade freely, and short-selling of overpriced stock is virtually
non-existent. These features of private markets prevent socially-neutral investors from
eliminating through arbitrage the subsidy from socially-motivated investors in the same
way they can in public markets. In short, the market for investments in privately held
companies is likely to be informationally inefficient; that is, more investors are likely to
have value-relevant private knowledge about the company that is not reflected in the
investment in public markets is value alignment rather than impact investing. In the end, whether the combination
of these types of socially-motivated investors is sufficient to affect returns is an empirical matter.
34. Even some published research makes this mistake. See, e.g., Cooper et al., supra note 33 (wrongly
suggests that purchasing existing shares within a company is the same as buying shares upon original offerings).
35. It may be more straightforward to structure this form of transaction through the provision of project
finance, which can be cast, in effect, as a commercial version of social impact bonds. See supra note 20.
36. In several instances, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation has made PRIs of this sort to induce a smallcap biotech company to develop products for neglected diseases in developing countries. See, e.g., David Bank
& Dennis Price, Returns on Investment: How a Broad Bet on a Biotech Company Paid Off in Promising Drugs
For
Neglected
Diseases,
STAN.
SOC.
INNOVATION
REV.
1
(2016),
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/returns_on_investment.
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trading price at which private interests change hands than is true in public markets. This
creates an opportunity for socially-motivated investors to create social value.
A. Concessionary Investments in Private Markets
An impact investor who is willing to sacrifice risk-adjusted returns can sometimes can
increase the socially-valuable outputs of an enterprise operating in non-public markets
because socially-neutral investors would not provide capital on the same favorable terms.
Thus, the impact investor would make a concessionary investment on such terms if she
believed that the subsidy (equivalent to the difference between a risk-adjusted market
return and the expected return from the concessionary investment) to the investee company
would create social value in an amount the investor values by an amount at least as great
as the return concession. Just as with risk clienteles (where more risk-tolerant investors
hold larger fractions of their portfolios in risky stocks and less risk-tolerant investors hold
larger fractions of their portfolios in less risky bonds), and tax clienteles (where investors
facing high tax rates invest larger fractions of their portfolios in tax-favored assets and
investors facing low tax rates invest a larger fraction of their portfolios in tax-disfavored
assets), the presence of impact investors and impact investment opportunities will give rise
to impact investment clienteles.
The dynamic of tax clienteles illustrates how the portfolio selection mechanics
operate. Investors must assemble a portfolio of investments designed to maximize aftertax risk-adjusted returns. Suppose there are two types of riskless assets: taxable bonds
issued by companies and the federal government, and tax-exempt bonds issued by state
and local governments. If these two types of bonds offered equal pre-tax returns, taxable
investors would prefer to hold the tax-exempt bonds. Their demand for tax-exempt bonds
would bid up the price of those bonds, causing their yield to fall. The reduced yield on taxexempt bonds allows state and local governments to borrow more cheaply than other
borrowers. In effect, they are able to collect taxes implicitly through subsidized borrowing
rates.
Taxpayers who face a 30% tax on returns from the taxable bond would be indifferent
between investing in a taxable bond that yields a 5% return and a tax-exempt bond that
yields 5% x (1 – 30%) or 3.5%. Tax-exempt investors (like foundations) would prefer to
own the 5% taxable bond and none of the tax-exempt bond. In turn, taxpayers facing tax
rates above 30% would prefer to own the 3.5% tax-exempt bond and none of the taxable
bond. Taxpayers facing different tax rates thus sort themselves naturally into tax
clienteles.37
Now consider social impact investment clienteles. Investors who value creating social
value most highly will invest in companies where their investment will increase the social
output of the investee company, and will feel appropriately compensated for doing so. The
marginal socially-motivated investor will be indifferent between a concessionary
investment in the social value-producing company at a discounted expected risk-adjusted
financial return that comes bundled with a social impact “bonus,” and investing in a
37. It is useful to note that unless restrictions are placed on the ability to borrow (short-sell) one type of
bond or the other, a taxpayer facing a tax rate different from 30% could create arbitrage profits. For example, a
40% taxpayer could “print wealth” by borrowing at 5% pretax and 5% x (1 – 40%) or 3% after tax and investing
the proceeds from the loan in tax-exempt bonds yielding 3.5%. To prevent this possibility, the interest from
borrowing to purchase tax-exempt bond is not deductible.
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socially-neutral investment at a higher risk-adjusted return but no social impact bonus. And
just as with tax clienteles, there will be infra-marginal investors on both sides of
indifference. The most socially-minded investors who place the largest value on creating
social value will get a bargain. They will receive more financial return than they would
have required to invest. And the least socially-minded investors will simply not include the
social impact investment in their portfolio.38
B. Non-Concessionary Investments in Private Markets
The opportunity to create social value through non-concessionary investments also is
greater in private than in public markets. As noted above, private markets are less
informationally efficient than public markets. An investment officer for a foundation, or
the general partner of an impact investing private fund, that specializes in a particular sector
may possess the same kind of special knowledge about, say, enterprises delivering health
or education services to underserved populations that venture capitalists and private equity
investors have about the technology, social media, and biotech industries. In both cases,
their knowledge and expertise, not widely held by others, may enable the fund managers
to make savvy investments that either are not noticed or mistakenly thought to be too risky
by other investors. Just as the conventional venture capitalist or private equity investor may
have special information about an investee company’s financial prospects, the nonconcessionary impact investor seeks special information about both an investee’s potential
social impact and its financial prospects.
However, the non-concessionary impact investor faces difficulties, and perhaps even
conflicts, not faced by her concessionary cousin. Both investors seek to create social value,
which, as we have seen, requires meeting two criteria: (1) the investee firm itself produces
socially valuable outputs and (2) the investment reduces the cost of capital to the investee
firm (compared to investments from socially-neutral investors) and thereby, can be
expected to increase the firm’s socially valuable outputs. But while the concessionary
investor is willing to sacrifice financial return to meet these criteria, the non-concessionary
investor is not. Thus, a third criterion also must be satisfied: (3) the investment must be
expected to earn a risk-adjusted market-rate return.39 A Venn diagram of the choices shows
that a non-concessionary impact investor limits itself to the area of overlap between
market-rate financial returns and increased social outputs.
38. Of course, measuring social value creation is a nontrivial task, and each investor may place a different
value on social outcomes. But this heterogeneity is also present when investors trade off risk and return or pretax
and after-tax returns when different investors face different tax rates. In any event, Harrison Hong & Marcin
Kacperczyk, The Price of Sin: The Effects of Social Norms on Markets, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 15 (2009), make a useful
effort to measure empirically the effects of a socially-motivated clientele on shareholder returns, showing that
investors in “sin” stocks earn more than risk-adjusted returns. The outcome was then contested. David Blitz &
Frank J. Fabozzi, Sin Stocks Revisited: Resolving the Sin Stock Anomaly, 44 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 1 (2017), report
that the greater than risk-adjusted returns disappear when additional factors are added to the asset pricing model.
39. Note that impact funds that are able to generate risk-adjusted financial outperformance (so-called
investment “alpha”) but that set market returns as their goal, create capacity to produce social impact by investing
on both a concessionary and non-concessionary basis. If they are able to identify opportunities that produce social
impact and market returns or greater, whereas other investors anticipate financial returns that fall below the level
that socially-neutral investors would demand, then their investment can create social value without sacrificing
financial return. Moreover, they have room to make a financial concession equal to some or all of the excess
financial return above the market return they would otherwise earn, thereby further reducing the investee’s cost
of capital and magnifying the social impact while still earning market returns or better.
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To understand the non-concessionary investor’s difficulties in seeking to operate in
the overlap space, imagine that she is the general partner of a fund that promises its limited
partners both social impact and market-rate returns. If there are many opportunities that
present this overlap in the fund’s particular domain, everyone is happy. But if such
opportunities are scarce, the general partner will have to compromise one or the other goal.
Especially because she and her limited partners will find it much easier to measure financial
success than the social value created, the latter is likely to be sacrificed, intentionally or
not.40
Another difficulty arises with non-concessionary private market impact investments.
Assume that the investee firm has the capacity to scale its outputs: the more that is invested,
the more the enterprise will be able to produce socially-valuable outputs and still provide
socially-motivated investors a market return. The asset manager’s general partner who
discovered the opportunity can direct investments to the firm in two ways: by attracting
more investors to her fund, thereby increasing her investable funds; or by spreading the
40. Bengt Holmström was awarded the 2016 Nobel Prize in economics in part for the insight that the
optimal incentive contract for managers depends on the extent to which the manager’s principal is able to observe
the
manager’s
effort.
Bengt
Holmström—Facts,
NOBEL
PRIZE,
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economics/2016/holmstrom/facts/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2017). In particular,
Holmström (with Paul Milgrom) showed that when a manager is asked to accomplish two goals but his
performance can be measured only with respect to one, the second goal, in retrospect not surprisingly, will receive
less attention. Bengt Holmström & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts,
Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24, 35 (1991). Holmström and Milgrom’s insight correctly
predicts the matter of concern here: that asset managers with a fund that seeks investments from sociallymotivated investors will choose to be compensated based only on financial returns, presumably unwilling to bear
the risk of poorly specified, and so relatively unobservable, social outcomes. A recent announcement of a new
socially-motivated fund by TPG, a large private equity firm, in conjunction with Bono, a socially-committed
recording star, illustrates the point. While the parties are committed to non-concessionary financial returns, the
motivation for the $2 billion fund is to create social value. The fund claims to have its own metrics for measuring
the social value it creates; however, the asset managers’ compensation will be based only on financial
performance. Andrew Ross Sorkin, New Fund Seeks Both Financial and Social Returns, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK
(Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/19/business/dealbook/a-new-fund-seeks-both-financial-andsocial-returns.html. Following Holmström and Milgrom, compensation based only on financial measures can be
expected to further bias such managers toward financial returns and away from creating social value. We also
note that the potential for a conflict between a general partner’s financial incentives and the fund’s investors desire
to create social value can also arise as the fund needs to secure liquidity as it approaches the end of its term
(typically ten years). Here the concern would be that the general partner would then influence portfolio companies
to sacrifice social value creation secure liquidity. See JACOB GRAY ET AL., WHARTON U. PA. SOC. IMPACT
INITIATIVE, GREAT EXPECTATIONS: MISSION PRESERVATION AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE IN IMPACT
INVESTING 3 (2015), https://socialimpact.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Great-ExpectationsMission-Preservation-and-Financial-Performance-in-Impact-Investing.pdf.
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word about the investment to other investors, including competing funds. Foundations
making (inevitably concessionary) PRIs are often happy to get the word out with the hope
of sharing the burden. But unless our general partner needs co-founders beyond her budget
to make the investment viable, she will typically reserve the opportunities for her own
limited partners, thereby restricting social value creation.

VII. THE THIRD BIG QUESTION: CAN THE POWER OF CONSUMERS, EMPLOYEES,
CORPORATE ACTIVISTS, AND REGULATORS FACILITATE SOCIAL VALUE CREATION?
This Article focuses on the power of investors to achieve social impact through the
financial leverage created by their investments. Other stakeholders, however, can also exert
leverage, and sometimes more effectively. When one investor sells her stock in a publiclytraded company, tautologically another investor takes his place. In contrast, each consumer
who refuses to purchase apparel made under poor labor conditions detracts incrementally
from the seller’s bottom line. A company that treats its workers poorly may not be able to
recruit valuable employees. And a company that despoils the environment may be
scrutinized by regulators who have immense power over its practices. Such considerations
make it clear that even socially-neutral investors may be very interested in assessing the
ESG performance of potential investee companies.
Consumers are particularly influential when they act in concert as part of an organized
movement intended to affect a firm economically or to influence regulators. Investors can
contribute to such a movement both symbolically and, perhaps, by instilling in corporate
managers a degree of fear of unanticipated consequences. Although divestment seldom has
direct economic consequences to the portfolio company, the signaling effect of divestment
by a high-profile investor may provide publicity and support for more effective stakeholder
efforts, including ESG-type proxy proposals.
The potential for an investment decision to contribute to an effort to influence firm
behavior is highly dependent on the specific context. At one extreme, a silent
investment/divestment decision not noticed by other stakeholders will have no influence,
since investment decisions can have signaling power only if they are known. At the other
extreme is a highly-publicized decision made as part of a concerted boycott movement by
a respected investor, for example, the Rockefeller Family Charity’s recent decision to
divest fossil fuel investments, including those initiated by John D. Rockefeller.41
The 1990s movement to divest from companies doing business with South Africa and
the current movement to divest from companies extracting fossil fuels or that manufacture
firearms are examples of divestment playing a role in broad social movements to influence
the behavior of its targets. The strategies are essentially political; the more stakeholders
who express disapproval of the behavior, the more effective the effort.
41. Rupert Neate, Rockefeller Family Charity to Withdraw All Investments in Fossil Fuel Companies,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 23, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/mar/23/rockefeller-funddivestment-fossil-fuel-companies-oil-coal-climate-change.
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An empirical study of the South Africa divestment movement suggests that
divestment had little if any effect on the capital markets, though it may have contributed to
publicizing the moral issues.42 It is too early to assess the effects of the current movement
targeting fossil fuels or firearm companies. As of this writing in early 2018, the coal
industry is economically distressed and the oil industry’s experience has been subject to
significant variance. But other factors, such as the advent of plentiful natural gas through
fracking, improvements in solar and wind energy in part through government subsidies,
and government regulations, such as renewable energy portfolio standards, may fully
account for the situation. Few doubt that changes in consumer behavior, such as increased
use of public transportation and electric and energy-efficient automobiles, as well as
regulatory changes, such as a carbon tax, could significantly reduce CO2 emissions.
Similarly, the growing public response to firearms production following the Parkland
school shooting may influence legislators and regulators to impose more effective limits
on their manufacture or sale.43 Divestment may serve as a rallying point for such other
actions, but as we have argued in this essay, the sale of publicly traded stock alone will
have little direct economic consequences.
In one critical respect, however, socially-motivated investors may have the ability to
influence portfolio company decisions by facilitating consumer boycotts. There is evidence
that consumer boycotts can influence company behavior, and that an important part of the
success results from company-perceived reputational damage rather than only from the
boycott’s immediate financial impact.44 A high-profile impact investor with a stake in a
boycotted company may be able to leverage the combination of its image and its financial
investment to facilitate consumers’ effort to influence the targeted company through
withholding patronage.

42. Siew Hong Teoh et al., The Effect of Socially Activist Investments Policies on Financial Markets:
Evidence from the South African Boycott, 72 J. BUS. 35, 83 (1999) concludes:
In all, the evidence from both individual and legislative actions, taken together, suggests that
the South African boycott had little valuation effect on the financial sector. Despite the
prominence and publicity of the boycott and the multitude of divesting companies, the
financial markets’ valuations of targeted companies or even the South African financial
markets themselves were not easily visibly affected. The sanctions may have been effective in
raising the public moral standards or public awareness of South African repression, but it
appears that financial markets managed to avoid the brunt of the sanctions.
Id. This may be an important point . . . for future activists who are considering using the tools of the boycott for
other causes.” Cf., Bernard Feigenbaum & Anton Lowenberg, South African Disinvestment: Causes and Effects,
6 CONTEMP. POL’Y ISSUES 105 (1988).
43. See, e.g., Michael Scherer, Florida Gov. Rick Scott Breaks with NRA to Sign New Gun Regulations,
WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/florida-gov-rick-scott-breaks-withnra-to-sign-new-gun-regulation/2018/03/09/e5d1f02e-23b2-11e8-86f654bfff693d2b_story.html?utm_term=.1efe1b65f2df (explaining Florida governor and legislature’s support of gun
regulations).
44. For example, Mary-Hunter McDonnell and Brayden King report that a significant number of large
companies that were the subject of a consumer boycott made changes in response, even when the boycott did not
significantly reduce company revenues. See generally Mary-Hunter McDonnell & Brayden King, Keeping up
Appearances: Reputational Threat and Impression Management after Social Movement Boycotts, 58 ADMIN. SCI.
Q. 387 (2013). Of course, in consumer markets, reputation is tied closely to financial results. McDonnell and
King argue that their data shows a company response in excess of what the observed immediate financial results
of the boycott would explain.
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A. ESG Criteria as Proxies for Financial Value
Concern over ESG criteria may influence companies through a channel different than
actions taken by socially-motivated investors. With respect to fossil fuel production, large
institutional investors and especially large mutual funds (including index funds) recently
have become much more likely to vote in favor of shareholder environmental proxy
proposals that would require fossil fuel companies to become more transparent concerning
the relationship between climate change and their business strategy. These explicitly
socially-neutral investors now seem more willing to support proxy proposals that are based
on a link between ESG factors and portfolio firm profitability.
A proxy proposal made to Occidental Petroleum in May 2017 is a useful example.
The non-binding proposal asked that Occidental issue an annual report assessing the impact
of long-term climate change on its business, including environmentally-based scenario
planning. This was the first shareholder proposal of this type that commanded a majority
vote at a major U.S. oil company. Equally telling, it was the first time that BlackRock, the
world’s largest asset manager, voted for a shareholder environmental proposal that
management opposed.45 The Occidental proxy contest then was followed by shareholder
approval of a similar proposal at Exxon Mobil.46
Critical to this approach, for both environmental activists and asset managers, is that
the Occidental and Exxon Mobil proposals and asset managers’ voting principles,47 are
keyed to improving the targeted companies’ financial performance. As discussed earlier, 48
recent Labor Department statements concerning ERISA compliance allows a pension plan
fiduciary to take into account environmental concerns in its asset management as long as
the decisions, whether with respect to an investment decision or in voting pension fund
securities, are not concessionary—that is, they do not reduce the expected risk-adjusted
return to the fund. Thus, proposals are framed in terms of the positive effect on a company’s
financial performance of greater attention to the business consequences of climate change.
A different group of shareholders—large index-based mutual funds—followed an
alternative approach to influence portfolio company behavior. Because investors have
shifted very large amounts of assets from actively managed equity mutual funds to equity

45. Erin Ailworth, Occidental Shareholders Vote for Climate Proposal, WALL ST. J. (May 12, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/occidental-shareholders-vote-for-climate-proposal-1494616669.
BlackRock’s
explanation for its Exxon Mobil vote is contained in its announcement that it had voted in favor of the shareholder
proposal; Press Release, BlackRock, Supporting a Shareholder Proposal Following Extensive Management
Engagement,
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/press-release/blk-vote-bulletin-exxon-may2017.pdf (May 31, 2017).
46. See Lyuba Goltser & Kaitlin Descovich, Investor Support Heating Up For Climate Change Proposals,
HARV.
L.
SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOV.
&
FIN.
REG.
(July
3,
2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/03/investor-support-heating-up-for-climate-change-proposals/. Prior to
this vote, BlackRock, as well as Vanguard and Fidelity, routinely voted against environmental proposals of any
character that were opposed by management. Id.
47. For example, BlackRock’s proxy voting guidelines voting principles can be found at BlackRock,
PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES FOR U.S. SECURITIES (2018), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/factsheet/blk-responsible-investment-guidelines-us.pdf. Vanguard’s (another very large mutual fund company)
voting guidelines are available at https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/policies-and-guidelines/;
STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, PROXY VOTING AND ENGAGEMENT GUIDELINES (2018),
https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-governance/2018/03/Proxy-Voting-andEngagement-Guidelines-NA-20180301.pdf.
48. See supra note 19.
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index funds, and because of the concentration of index funds with the three largest funds—
BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street making up some 90% of total index fund
investment—these funds are quantitatively important shareholders.49 Taken together, these
three institutional investors are the largest shareholders in 88% of S&P 500 companies.50
In January 2017, Blackstone’s CEO, Larry Fink, sent a letter to the CEOs of its portfolio
companies stating BlackRock’s basis for assessing company management: “To prosper
over time, every company must not only deliver financial performance, but also show how
it makes a positive contribution to society. Companies must benefit all of their
stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, customers, and the communities in which
they operate.”51 Because BlackRock cannot sell shares in index funds if they believe
portfolio company strategies are ill-advised, the company intends to have continual
“engagement” with their management to influence company decisions.
This strategy took concrete form following the 2018 Parkland, Florida school
shooting. BlackRock, the largest shareholder in the three largest U.S. firearms
manufacturers, urged firearms manufacturers to assess their business strategies concerning
distribution of their products and noting that it might vote against directors of companies
who did not respond appropriately. It also announced that it intended to offer an index
product that excluded firearms manufacturers.52
Outside the proxy proposal context, proponents of ESG factors as a measure of
investment desirability extend the argument that socially responsible behavior leads to
better company performance one step further. Rather than seeking to improve the quality
and availability of information assessing the impact of environmental factors on a
company’s long term performance, proponents argue that high ESG ratings have a direct

49. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors
and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COL. L. REV. 863, 883 (2013) (tracing the growing intermediation
of equity).
50. Jan Fichtner et al., Hidden Power of the Big Three: Passive Index Funds, the Re-concentration of
Corporate Ownership and the New Financial Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298 (2017). Large index tracking funds recent
reduction of management fees to zero can be expected to further solidify the dominance of the largest index fund
providers. Not surprisingly, inflows of capital into index funds go overwhelmingly to funds with fees in the lowest
quartile. See Chris Flood, Price Quake Heralds the Glorious Era of Zero-Cost Index Funds, FIN. TIMES, (Aug. 5,
2018),
https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridgecore/content/view/30AD689509AAD62F5B677E916C28C4B6/S1469356917000064a.pdf/div-class-titlehidden-power-of-the-big-three-passive-index-funds-re-concentration-of-corporate-ownership-and-newfinancial-risk-a-href-fns01-ref-type-fn-a-div.pdf.
51. Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s Annual Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose, BLACKROCK,
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-gb/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter (last visited Sept. 17, 2018).
52. Press Release, BlackRock, BlackRock’s Approach to Companies that Manufacture and Distribute
Civilian
Firearms
(Mar.
2,
2018),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/newsroom/pressreleases/article/corporate-one/press-releases/blackrock-approach-to-companies-manufacturing-distributingfirearms. In its release, BlackRock was careful to stress the potential cost to companies from the public response
to misuse of their products, as with the oil company proxy contests voicing a business rather than a social concern.
The gun manufacturers’ response highlighted the awkward application of fiduciary duties in these circumstances.
American Outdoor Brands, which manufactured the weapon used in the Florida attack, responded to BlackRock’s
March 2nd letter by staying closely to its existing strategy: “We believe that our stockholders are well aware of
the products we manufacture and fully understand the risks associated with investing in a firearms manufacturer.”
Sheeraz Raza, American Outdoor Brands Corporation Issues Detailed Rebuttal to BlackRock (Mar. 6, 2018),
https://www.valuewalk.com/2018/03/american-outdoor-brands-corporation-issues-detailed-rebuttal-toblackrock/.
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impact on profitability.53 As discussed above, proponents of fossil fuel divestiture argue
that current stock prices do not reflect the impact of future environmental regulation on the
ownership value of “stranded assets”―coal, oil, or gas.54
The argument, while superficially attractive, is implausible. Information concerning
stranded assets is publicly available, and proponents offer no explanation for why this risk
is not already reflected in existing stock prices through the actions of socially-neutral
analysts and investors. From this perspective, ESG factors and reliance on fossil fuels
reflect a familiar part of standard fundamental analysis. Absent a better argument, there is
no reason to believe that equity analysts are systematically less able to assess the valuation
implications of these factors, such as stranded assets, than of non-ESG factors.55
Other studies have posed similar hypotheses. Suppose a company’s social capital,
including the trust stakeholders have in the company, allow the company to contract more
effectively with its stakeholders, including labor and capital market participants, over items
that are not otherwise observable or verifiable. In that situation, a company’s ESG ratings
may provide a credible signal of the company’s less observable social capital. 56 It would
follow that better ESG ratings could lead to a company having greater social capital and so
higher productivity.57
Again, however, the same problem appears. If ESG ratings and investments in ESG
affect productivity, then they should already be reflected in companies’ stock prices;
companies then will have selected and invested in achieving the efficient level of ESG
rating. The Sustainability Accounting Standards Board presses for standardized disclosure
of ESG factors that are material to investment decisions.58 We strongly support

53. See, e.g., FirstCarbon Solutions, Sustainability Metrics: ESG Actions Make for Profitable Business,
ADEC
INNOVATIONS
(May
28,
2013,
5:50
AM),
https://info.esg.adecinnovations.com/blog/bid/293787/Sustainability-Metrics-ESG-Actions-Make-for-Profitable-Business.
54. See, e.g., Karel Beckman, An Investor Speaks: The Oil Party is Almost Over, ENERGY POST (Feb. 21,
2014), http://www.energypost.eu/investor-speaks-oil-party-almost/.
55. Henri Sevaes & Ane Tamayo, The Role of Social Capital: A Review, OXF. REV. ECON. POL’Y,
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 22), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2933393 (Click
“Download This Paper” link) (“[W]e believe that if prices do not fully reflect the fundamentals of a company and
if this information is readily available, there is sufficient arbitrage capital available to correct any mispricing.”).
56. Steven Blader et al., The Real Effects of Relational Contracts, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 452, 452 (2015)
(developing the importance of social capital or trust in contracting with stakeholders).
57. Id. In this vein, Amiraslani et al. recently sought to test empirically the link between a company’s
trustworthiness and its access to the bond market, where bond market access was measured by secondary market
bond spreads and trustworthiness was measured by ESG activities. Over the period 2005 through 2013, the authors
find that, on average, there is no relation between corporate bond spreads and ESG investment. Trust, as measured
by ESG, does not signal that an issuer is less likely to take advantage of its bondholders. The results are strikingly
different between August 2008 and March 2009, when the literature finds that the financial crisis caused a shock
to information concerning companies’ trustworthiness. The authors report that their “results are unambiguous:
during the [financial] crisis of trust, secondary market credit spreads of high-CSR [ESG] firms did not rise as
much as the spreads of low-CSR [ESG] firms.” They “conclude that corporate social capital [as measured by
ESG] affects bond contracting and pricing when it matters most: when there is a crisis of trust and bondholders
seek reassurance that they will not be expropriated.” Hani Amiraslani et al., The Bond Market Benefits of
Corporate
Social
Capital
6
(ECGI
Fin.,
Working
Paper
No.
535/2017,
2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2978794 (click “Download This Paper” link).
58. See, e.g., SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD (SASB) http://www.sasb.org/ (last
visited Mar. 3, 2018) (stating that the organization is committed to disclosure of material information). Materiality
also lies at the core of the investment strategies of Generation Investment Management LLP, an investment fund
founded by David Blood and Al Gore. See, e.g., GENERATION INV. MGMT., https://www.generationim.com/ (last
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encouraging companies to disclose ESG practices and other characteristics that will assist
investors in assessing the value of companies’ investments more accurately, as well as
provide information to stakeholders who wish to pursue consumer or politically directed
strategies. If done well, it will reduce the cost of acquiring that information by centralizing
its production through requiring disclosure by the party that has the least expensive access
to the information.59 However, it seems highly unlikely that socially-motivated, or even
socially-neutral, investors can systematically profit from identifying mispriced securities
based on such information.
VIII. CONCLUSION—AND ADVICE TO INVESTORS
The thrust of this essay is as follows:






Value alignment. Socially-motivated investors who only wish to align their
portfolios with their values must determine whether a potential investee
company’s outputs and practices are so aligned; and whether concentrated
holdings in or divestment from a particular sector will increase investors’
portfolio risk by reducing diversification. If portfolio risk is increased, then
the socially-motivated investor must decide whether they wish to pay the
price of value alignment. We do not denigrate value alignment. But we think
it is extremely important not to confuse it with social value creation.
Social value creation. As the term “impact” suggests, impact investors are
the subset of socially-motivated investors who wish to go beyond value
alignment to create social value by using their investment decisions to
influence a portfolio company’s performance. For an affirmative investment,
this requires that:
The investee company’s outputs or practices must have social value
beyond the private value created between firms and the parties with whom
they contract directly.
The investment either must (1) lower the cost of capital to the company
compared to ordinary commercial markets, thereby allowing it to produce
more socially valuable outputs or to engage in more socially valuable
practices—the criteria for creating social value; or (2) allow the investor to
provide expertise that the portfolio company does not have, with the same
effect.
Public markets. It is virtually impossible for a socially-motivated investor to
affect the outputs or behavior of companies whose securities trade in public
markets through buying and selling their shares in the secondary market.
Socially-motivated investors who seek to affect public companies’ ESG
practices must join forces with consumers, employees, corporative activists,
and regulators. As we have seen, ESG-based proposals are gaining
institutional investor support where the proposals are explicitly tied to
company financial performance.

visited Oct. 8, 2017).
59. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549,
597–609 (1984) (discussing information costs and market efficiency).
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Concessionary investments in private markets. However, it is possible for
concessionary impact investors to affect the outputs of portfolio firms
through private market transactions by providing subsidies in the form of
accepting financial returns below the level that socially-neutral investors
would require. Foundations’ program-related investments are paradigmatic
of such subsidies. The difficulties of concessionary impact investments lie in
targeting the subsidy so as to benefit one’s intended beneficiaries rather than
other investors, or the company’s asset managers, through the absence of
accountability for whether and how much social value was created, and in
not adversely distorting the markets in which the firm operates.
Non-concessionary investments in private markets. It is also possible for
non-concessionary impact investors to affect the outputs of firms while still
earning a risk-adjusted market return through private market transactions by
taking advantage of private knowledge or special expertise that they or their
fund managers possess. However, non-concessionary investors’ claims to
have value-relevant private information should be viewed with healthy
skepticism. These investors are playing in a highly competitive game with
the universe of private equity investors whose success depends on
developing such private information. The ultimate test of a nonconcessionary impact investment is whether (1) the risk-adjusted financial
returns match the market, a familiar assessment for which there are accepted
measurement techniques, and (2) how much social value is created, for which
there is still little consensus on the difficult question of how value creation
should be measured. The differential measurability of financial value created
and social value created has resulted in asset managers running impact
investing funds being paid based (almost) exclusively on financial measures
of performance. If the managers’ success in creating social value cannot be
measured, neither can that of the investors providing the capital.

We disagree with those who define impact investing to include only concessionary,
or only non-concessionary investments. Under the right circumstances, both kinds of
investments can create social value. But the field can only grow responsibly if individual
investors, impact investing trade associations, foundation officers, and asset managers are
candid with themselves and others about the conditions necessary for social value to be
created and rigorous with respect to how it, and hence their performance, should be
measured.
And this leads us to offer some advice for the large majority of individual impact
investors who do not make direct investments but place their confidence in the general
partners of so-called impact funds.
 First, it is difficult, though not impossible, for a fund to create social value—
as opposed to achieve value alignment—while also promising to deliver
market-rate financial returns or better. Funds that promise both deserve
special scrutiny and a clear understanding of how both elements of fund
performance will be measured.
 Second, if the fund is serious about impact, it should report on social value
created as well as financial returns, including an estimate of that value
creation and a clear description of how it was calculated. A strong signal that
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the general partner is committed to social impact as well as to financial
returns would be that her compensation is based at least in part on the social
value created as well as on financial returns. We note that doing so is difficult
because vague measurement standards impose risk on the general partner
that affects incentives and so exacerbates the problem.60 In turn, that
difficulty helps explain the limited occasions on which impact investment
funds have sought to link general partner compensation and social value
created.
Third, make sure that the fund manager is using appropriate benchmarks for
the fund’s performance. The appropriate benchmark against which to
evaluate private investments is other private investments, including the
significant illiquidity premium associated with such investments.
Fourth, treat the presence of any public equities in a self-styled impact fund
as the thirteenth strike of the clock, which calls the others into question.61
Finally, the socially-screened ESG mutual fund industry should be regarded
as offering investors a value alignment strategy, not an impact investment

60. Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74, 74 (1979). There is little
literature concerning the difficulties of constructing a compensation contract that links the general partner’s
compensation directly to the amount of social value created. Christopher Geczy et. al., Contracts with Benefits:
The
Implementation
of
Impact
Investing
(revised
July
2,
2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3159731 (clikc “Download This Paper” link), report that
only 10% of their sample in any fashion formally link general partner compensation to social value created.
Consistent in order of magnitude, Transform Finance Investor Network in 2016 reported only four small impact
investment funds that did so. TRASNFORM FIN. INV. NETWORK, TYING FUND MANAGER COMPENSATION TO
IMPACT
OUTCOMES
(2016),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54cfca5be4b06d2d0d7c0f1d/t/57e285d1bebafb329d4a71fa/147446318584
6/TFIN+Issue+Brief+-+Tying+Carry+to+Impact+2016-09-12+v3.pdf. If social value is difficult to observe or to
measure with precision, one approach would be to distinguish between using contractual tools to make the
assessment of success more observable even if not verifiable with precision, such as advisory boards and
disclosure, as a substitute. This approach uses formal contracting to facilitate the development of trust between
the general partner and investors, in the contracting literature, a form of braiding formal and informal contracting
in which the formal elements of the contract focus on a process that endogenizes trust, between the parties and so
supports continued dealing based on reputation. See Ronald J. Gilson et. al., Braiding: The Interaction of Formal
and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377 (2010). A similar analysis
applies to the structure of venture capital limited partnerships. See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering Venture Capital
Markets: Lessons from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067 (2003). A second informal approach
would be to make impact investments in products and markets where the products and market themselves make
it easier to measure social value created. For example, the number of mosquito nets provided is subject to familiar
auditing techniques. Consistent with this intuition, the charities to which GiveWell, an organization that facilitates
donor gifts based on evidence of impact, transfers funds on behalf of donors, appear to share the characteristic
that the nature of the projects selected make the social value created more observable and so more measurable.
See GiveWell’s Impact, GIVEWELL (June 2018), https://www.givewell.org/about/impact. Bhagwan Chowdhry,
et. al., Investing for Impact, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/07/12/investing-for-impact/, thoughtfully explore the contracting
implications when the general partner cannot commit to a level of social value created because of observability
problems. Much work remains to be done in understanding how the standard private equity/venture capital
contracting models translate into the much more difficult tasks associated with the multi-task setting of impact
investing.
61. This is not to say that an investor should shun a portfolio that includes socially-neutral as well as
socially-motivated investments, as well as investments aimed at value alignment and value creation. The most
straightforward way to do this is through investments in separate funds, each of which describes its purpose,
expected financial return, and (in the case of an impact fund) how its impact will be measured.
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strategy. Prospective investors in such funds should take care to understand
the premium expense ratios charged by the sponsors of such funds, the
sacrifice in diversification these funds may impose on investors, and the
financial engineering employed to offset the diminished diversification.
Investors should also be skeptical of claims of impact that may appear in the
marketing materials for such funds.

